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A ‘right to have rights’ in the EU public sphere? An Arendtian justification 
for the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Eleni Frantziou* 
     
Abstract 
This paper discusses the Court’s reasoning in interpreting the EU Charter, using 
recent case law on horizontal effect as a case study. It identifies two possible means of 
interpreting the provisions of the Charter: firstly, an approach based on common 
values (e.g. equality or solidarity) and, secondly, an approach based on access to the 
public sphere. It argues in favour of the latter. Whereas an approach based on 
common values is more consonant with the development of the case law so far, it is 
conceptually problematic: it involves subjective assessments of the importance and 
degree of ‘sharedness’ of the value in question, which can undermine the equal 
constitutional status of different Charter provisions. Furthermore, it marginalises the 
Charter’s overall politically constructional character, which distinguishes it from other 
sources of rights protection listed in Art 6 TEU. The paper argues that, as the 
Charter’s provisions concretise the notion of political status in the EU, they have a 
primarily constitutional, rather than ethical, basis. Interpreting the Charter based on 
the very commitment to a process of sharing, drawing on Hannah Arendt’s idea of the 
‘right to have rights’ (a right to access a political community on equal terms), is 
therefore preferable. This approach retains the pluralistic, post-national fabric of the 
EU polity, as it accommodates multiple narratives about its underlying values, while 
also having an inclusionary impact on previously underrepresented groups (e.g. non-
market-active citizens or the sans-papiers) by recognising their equal political 
disposition.    
    
1.1 Introduction 
Is it necessary to justify the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
when a situation falls within the scope of EU law? Is it not sufficient to engage merely 
in a discussion – difficult in its own right1 – of when the scope of EU law is engaged 
and to then apply the provisions of the Charter once the latter is established, as the list 
of fundamental rights applicable within the European Union?2 In one sense, this is 
indeed the case. Perhaps there would be no reason to engage in a normative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Lecturer, University of Westminster. I am very grateful to Lea Raible for comments.  
1 For insightful discussions see A Rosas, ‘When does the Charter of Fundamental Rights applicable at 
national level?’ (2012) 19:4 Jurisprudence 1269; K Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8:3 EuConst 375. 
2 Case C-571/10 Kamberaj v Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano 
(IPES), ECLI:EU:C:2012:233, paras 62-63 and 79-81. See also L Ankersmit, ‘Case C-571/10 
Kamberaj: the Charter and not the ECHR has effect in national legal orders’ European Law Blog 26 
April 2012, available at: http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=433 (accessed 10 June 2016). 
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justification of the application of the EU Charter, if its provisions could be understood 
in the same manner across the Union, so that EU and Member State fundamental 
rights standards fully overlapped.3 The Charter is, after all, as its preamble makes 
clear, an instrument that enshrines fundamental rights common to the Member States, 
which are therefore already protected, in some form, in national law.  
 Despite being ‘common’ as a matter of principle though, fundamental rights 
are not always commonly interpreted across the EU. Their meaning is the subject of a 
great deal of constitutional debate. For example, beyond a bare minimum, there are 
substantial variations in the interpretation of human dignity,4 as well as, as the 
Melloni judgment revealed, in the interpretation of the scope of the right to a fair trial 
within the EU.5 To the extent that the Charter does not give rise merely to a minimum 
floor of rights but, rather, to definitive interpretations of their meaning across the EU6, 
an assessment of why the Charter should apply and in what way it offers a ‘better’ 
protection of fundamental rights than national law is therefore necessary.7 
Establishing that a situation falls within the scope of EU law and the EU Charter is 
not in itself sufficient in order to justify the choice of a particular interpretation of its 
provisions by the Court of Justice. How should such an assessment be made? On what 
basis can the Court of Justice decide where to place the Charter standard, so as to 
ensure both legal certainty and the legitimacy of its interpretation across the Union, 
even where national constitutional standards differ?  
 The most prominent justification for the application of fundamental rights in 
the EU to date, both in academic discourse and in the Court’s case law, has been the 
commonality of values from which fundamental rights are derived (such as human 
dignity, solidarity etc). As this paper aims to demonstrate, this approach is 
problematic in the Charter context: it can result in rather arbitrary judicial assessments 
of the importance of its different provisions and, most notably, those contained in its 
Solidarity chapter. This risks marginalising the Charter’s overall politically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In this article, I shall leave aside the question of the application of the EU Charter to EU institutions 
and discuss only its application within the Member States. 
4 C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19:4 EJIL 655, 
698ff. 
5 Case C-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. 
6 Ibid, paras 56-60.  
7 This is indeed essential in cases concerning shared competences, in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity (Art 5(3) TEU).  
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constructional character8 as a list of EU-wide public law commitments, which 
differentiates it from other sources of rights protection listed in Art 6 TEU. Instead, 
this paper argues that, in light of its drafting history and relationship to other sources 
of fundamental rights within the EU (the general principles of EU law and the 
European Convention of Human Rights), the most appropriate normative justification 
for the application of the Charter lies in its potential of delivering political equality in 
the post-national context.  
 More specifically, it will be argued that the Charter gives concrete meaning to 
the notion of political status in the EU public sphere and thus has a primarily 
constitutional, rather than ethical, basis. Drawing upon Hannah Arendt’s idea of the 
‘right to have rights’ as a right to access a political community on the basis of 
equality, the paper proposes that the Charter should be viewed primarily as a 
commitment to the process of sharing, rather than focusing on the ‘sharedness’ of 
particular values as the underpinning of rights. Understanding the right to have rights 
as the main normative justification for the Charter has significant benefits from the 
perspective of post-national constitutional adjudication, as it retains both the 
pluralistic constitutional fabric of the EU polity and can accommodate multiple 
narratives about its underlying values. This approach is preferable conceptually, 
because it recognises the structural role of fundamental rights in a public sphere that 
does not merely comprise the market. At the same time, it also benefits the 
adjudication of fundamental rights claims in the EU on a more practical level: 
understanding the supranational operation of fundamental rights based on the right to 
have rights organises the interaction of the constitutional courts entrusted with 
protecting these rights across the different levels of the EU legal order and limits the 
homogenising character of the supranational standard. 
 The paper starts by discussing the constructional role of the Charter in the EU 
public sphere, demonstrating its constitutional significance (section 1.2). It then goes 
on to show that justifying the application of the Charter on the basis of commonality 
of values, often translated into the development of general principles of law, is 
unsatisfactory. It risks reducing the constitutional character of the Charter as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 On the constructional nature of fundamental rights in the public sphere, see G Souillac, ‘From Global 
Norms to Local Change: Theoretical Perspectives on the Promotion of Human Rights in Societies in 
Transition’ in SA Horowitz and A Schnabel (eds), Human rights and societies in transition: causes, 
consequences, responses (United Nations University Press 2004); J Habermas, ‘Remarks on 
legitimation through human rights’ in J Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (M Pensky tr, Polity 
Press 2001) 117.  
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product of a process of political authorship and ascribes to the Court of Justice the 
function of assessing the relative significance of its different provisions (section 1.3). 
Ultimately, the paper argues that, as a list of constitutional rights that take effect 
beyond the state level, the application of the Charter can be more adequately justified 
based on the right to have rights - a conception of fundamental rights as vehicles of 
political membership (section 1.4). The arguments made herein are illustrated through 
the use of examples drawn from the field of the horizontal effect of fundamental 
rights.  
1.2 Understanding the Charter’s constructional role in the EU public sphere 
Constitutional law aims at the preservation of institutions that safeguard the 
conditions of common life that a given society commits to and is indeed premised on.9 
In a democratic polity, the constitution involves the idea of authorship on the part of 
its members (the public).10 At the same time, the constitution also defines the authors 
in the sense that it envisions their collective ‘politicalness’ in a particular manner.11 
Thus, whereas most constitutional thought will entail some universalist aspirations, to 
the extent that it is intended to organise common life by making arrangements that are 
considered the best possible12, as Dowdle and Wilkinson rightly note,  
‘constitutional discourse always has to acknowledge its rootedness in a 
particular polity, to acknowledge some spatial boundary and limit. [...] [T]he 
constitution is always constructed in a specific social setting with a specific 
political morality and contributes towards the building of a particular state or 
polity.’13 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 G Teubner, Constitutional fragments: societal constitutionalism and globalization (OUP 2012) 142-3. 
See also: J Raz, ‘On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries in L 
Alexander, Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge University Press 1998) 152, 
152-154. 
10 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 
(Polity Press 1996) 143; H Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 1990) 145. See also: UK Preuss, 
‘Constitutional Power-Making for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations Between the 
Constituent Power and the Constitution’ (1992-1993) 14 Cardozo Law Review 639. 
11 SS Wolin, ‘Collective Identity and the Constitutional State’ in The Presence of the Past: Essays on 
the State and the Constitution (Johns Hopkins University Press 1989) 9; Dowdle and Wilkinson (n 12) 
6-7. See, more generally: M Loughlin and N Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: 
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (OUP 2007).  
12 MW Dowdle, and MA Wilkinson, ‘On the Limits of Constitutional Liberalism: In Search of a 
Constitutional Reflexivity’ (November 3, 2015), NUS Law Working Paper No. 2015/009. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2686013, accessed 10 May 2016, 20. 
13 Ibid, 20-21; See also Neil Walker, ‘The Place of European Law’ in G De Búrca and JHH Weiler 
(eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (OUP 2012) 57, 65. 
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In turn, fundamental rights instituted through constitutional law14, whether national or 
post-national, are important claims about how a particular political community can be 
legitimately run.15 The creation of a set of rights with a ‘fundamental’ status ascribes 
to these rights direct organisational functions.16 In addition to any questions about 
what protections a dignified, minimally worthwhile human life entails, fundamental 
rights concern the conditions of membership of a community defined by a particular 
institutional framework.17  
Understood in this sense, fundamental rights to equality, freedom of speech, or 
privacy, do not just protect basic human needs, but are at the same time preconditions 
for the existence of a diverse and inclusive public sphere.18 A breach of a fundamental 
constitutional right does not only concern the individuals affected by that breach, but 
also the way in which a political community collectively chooses to organise itself.19 
As Geneviève Souillac has usefully pointed out, particularly where constitutional 
transitions are taking place (such as in the EU today), fundamental rights lists can 
assume an ‘architectural role’.20 They have a constructional function for an emerging 
public sphere, because they institutionalise conditions for ‘appropriate forms of 
governance’ to be developed and provide ‘structural legitimacy’ to newly founded 
political institutions.21 In other words, fundamental rights proclaimed within a 
political community have an inherently public dimension. They are not only about the 
recognition of a person as a human being, but also about the recognition of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 I use the terms public law and constitutional lw interchangeably to denote the law applicable to the 
process of governing : M Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP 2003) 5-7. 
15 Loughlin, ibid. See also M Loughlin, The Foundations of Public Law (OUP 2010) 108. 
16 Of course, this is true only to the extent that this political community can be considered as ‘authored’ 
by its members : Habermas, (n 10) 143. 
17 There are, of course, significant overlaps between human rights and constitutional rights taking effect 
within particular communities. It is important to clarify that separating the justifications for human 
rights and for fundamental constitutional rights is not intended to relativise the importance of the 
former within constitutional law: Habermas, (n 10) 118, 456ff. Rather, ‘human rights themselves are 
what satisfies the requirement that a civic practice of the public use of communicative freedom be 
legally institutionalised’: Habermas, (n 10) 89. The legitimacy of constitutional rights lists which do 
not include human rights could be strongly challenged, to the extent that human rights have enabling 
functions and thus constitute basic conditions in order for the members of a political community to take 
part in collective deliberation meaningfully: J Habermas, ‘On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of 
Law and Democracy’ in J Habermas (ed), The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory 
(Polity Press 1999) 253, 259. A positive law paradigm that has rid itself of human rights will be 
inherently problematic: in order to bring about a free and substantively equal public sphere, human 
rights and positive law are mutually presupposed: Ibid, 258-62.  
18 Habermas, (n 10) 321. 
19 PW Kahn, ‘Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory’ (1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 1, 20-
28; See also B Ackerman, ‘The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution’ (1984) 93 Yale Law 
Journal 1013, 1040-1043; and, more generally, Habermas (n 10) 
20  Souillac (n 8) 79. 
21 Ibid 81, 93.  
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political status within a defined institutional framework.22 In turn, constitutional 
adjudication aims precisely at the safeguard of the process of self-government / 
collective authorship.23  
A constitutional understanding of rights resonates well with the EU Charter, 
when the latter is placed in its drafting context. As is well known, the concept of 
fundamental rights was initially absent from the Treaties. It only entered EU law 
through judicial interpretation, in the form of general principles of law developed in 
the Court’s early case law.24 Today, however, the Charter collects fundamental rights 
in the EU and ascribes to them a constitutional status.25 It contains a diverse set of 
provisions, such as the right to life26, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment27, and respect for private and family life28, as well 
as rights to fair working conditions29, to be informed and consulted in the workplace30 
and the right to take collective action, including the right to strike.31 Moreover, it 
includes a series of provisions with a less universal character, such as the free 
movement of persons32 and political rights for EU citizens, such as the right to vote 
and to stand as candidate in European elections.33  
Yet, in spite of the wide-ranging nature of the protections it enshrines, the 
Charter’s preamble makes clear that this document does not introduce new rights, but 
merely enhances the visibility of existing rights within EU law.34 For this reason, it 
has been argued that the Charter does not change much in the EU fundamental rights 
regime, because fundamental rights were already ‘for the informed observer, there in 
the Court’s case law prior to the entry into force of the Charter, in the form of general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (2nd ed, Harcourt 1958) 299-301; Habermas (n 10) 89 
23 MA Wilkinson, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the European Union’ (2013) 76:2 Modern Law 
Review 191, 209. See also M Loughlin (n 14) 108ff.  
24 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- Und Vorratsstelle Getreide [1970] ECR I-
1125, para 4.  
25 Article 6(1) TEU provides that the Charter shall have “the same legal value as the Treaties”.  
26 Article 2 EUCFR. 
27 Article 4 EUCFR. 
28 Article 7 EUCFR. 
29 Article 31 EUCFR. 
30 Article 27 EUCFR. 
31 Article 28 EUCFR. 
32 Article 45 EUCFR. 
33 Article 39 EUCFR. 
34 House of Lords EU Select Committee, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment’ (HL Paper 62, 
August 2007) paras 5.37–5.41.  
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principles.’35 While the Charter may not contribute to the EU fundamental rights 
regime in the sense of creating new content though, when understood in light of the 
functions of public law, discussed above, as well as the history of European 
integration, it does have a distinct constitutional import.  
The Charter carried a symbolic meaning as EU Member States entered a phase 
of deeper political integration under the Lisbon Treaty.36 In line with its preamble, its 
fifty substantive provisions express a commitment, on the part of ‘the peoples of 
Europe’, ‘to share a peaceful future based on common values’ (those of ‘human 
dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity’, which are in turn to be delivered based on 
‘the principles of democracy and the rule of law).37  Furthermore, while the Charter 
only acquired binding force on the 1st of December 2009, together with the Lisbon 
Treaty, it is important not to forget that it is in fact at least one decade older. The 
Charter was drafted at the Cologne European Council in 1999, taking over the 
recommendations put forth in an influential report by Professor Simitis, which had 
expressed the worry that it was no longer sufficient for EU fundamental rights to 
mirror the ECHR but that, rather, a European Bill of Rights reflecting the “Union 
experience” was required.38  
It was therefore clear from the very beginning that the idea of an EU Charter 
would not be designed merely as a mirroring of regional and global human rights 
standards, but precisely because these standards were not a sufficient reflection of the 
things that made up a properly-so-called EU constitutional identity.39 The designation 
of a group of rights as ‘fundamental’ under EU law was intended to give these rights 
independent interpretative value vis-à-vis Member State and international standards 
(not necessarily by antagonising these standards but by emphasising that EU 
fundamental rights were based on but, at the same time, not simply reducible to, these 
standards alone). The Charter thus added structure to novel, at that time, concepts, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 S Morano-Foadi and S Andreadakis, ‘Reflections on the Architecture of the EU after the Treaty of 
Lisbon: The European Judicial Approach to Fundamental Rights’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 
595, 599. 
36 G De Burca and B Aschenbrenner, ‘The Development Of European Constitutionalism And The Role 
Of The EU Charter Of Fundamental Rights’ (2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 355, 364–
65.  
37 Preamble to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, [2010] OJ C 83/389. 
38 European Commission Expert Group on Fundamental Rights, Affirming Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union: Time to Act (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1999) 10. 
39 See Articles 2 and 4 TEU. 
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such as EU citizenship, and aspirations, such as federalisation.40 It was, in other 
words, proposed as an attempt to distil – or even to construct – a list of public goods 
that define a collective ‘we’ to which EU citizens from different states would relate. A 
binding Charter signalled not only an institutional commitment to fundamental rights 
in respect of EU action, but also a potential basis for civil society to exert pressure on 
the EU to ensure that its actions complied with basic rights and freedoms.41 
  While its substantive provisions were not drastically altered since its non-
binding declaration in the Treaty of Nice, it was only under the negotiations 
concerning the Constitutional Treaty that the Charter would acquire its current 
preamble, a more defined scope of application and, crucially, a binding legal status. 
The working documents of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the Charter was 
understood as an important civic bond. Not only did the Constitution envisage a 
judicially cognisable and enforceable Charter, but it is also clear from the travaux 
préparatoires that all of the participants had either actively supported or, at least, 
favourably considered a form of incorporation in the Treaties that would give the 
Charter a constitutional – and not a merely legally binding – status.42 As De Burca 
and Aschenbrenner note, ‘[t]he decision to confer legal status on the Charter is thus 
necessarily linked with the discussion on a constitution for Europe and especially with 
the political debate on the future shape of the EU.’43 Its symbolism as a platform for a 
minimum common constitutional identity is therefore crucial to understanding the 
Charter’s constitutional role. Constitutional symbols are important in the forging of 
bonds and the creation of a public, especially in a post-national context, where the 
constitution does not stem from a cohesive demos with clearly identifiable 
characteristics.44  
 Of course, it is questionable whether the Charter was in fact capable of 
delivering outcomes such as heightened legitimacy, constitutional identification, or a 
sense of belonging. Its drafting process has been criticised precisely for a lack of civic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See P Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’ (2002) 39 
Common Market Law Review 945, 990. 
41 Ibid. 
42 European Union, Preparatory Working Documents for the European Convention (EUR-OP 2004) 
190-1 (Final Report of Working Group II, CONV 354/02, 22 October 2002, 189). 
43 De Burca and Aschenbrenner (n 36) 372. 
44 See N Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problems of Translation’ in M Wind and JHH 
Weiler (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (CUP 2003) 27. 
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participation and, thus, for a lack of representativeness.45 This concern is heightened 
in the aftermath of the rejection of the Constitution in referenda in France and the 
Netherlands and the integration of the Charter within the Lisbon Treaty. It is well-
documented in the literature that the compromise reached in Lisbon resulted in a 
much more sombre Treaty, with the Charter being one of the few remnants of the 
symbolism that had characterised the Constitution.46  
Indeed, the lack of a coherent constitutional narrative within the Lisbon Treaty 
has understandably left the Court hesitant as regards the Charter’s legal value. Even 
though the Charter still rests ‘at the highest possible level of European Union law 
equal to the Treaties’47, the grandiose opening of its preamble, which appeared at 
home in the Constitution for Europe, now seems to some extent out of place against 
the background of the dry and formal tone that characterises the biggest part of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.48 
Furthermore, as Dieter Grimm has recently highlighted, the Charter does not have 
higher constitutional status than any of the provisions of the Treaties, including 
provisions of the TFEU.49 This renders its role in respect of interpreting other aspects 
of the Treaty unclear, and can result in tension in case of conflict between the 
provisions enshrined in the Charter and the market freedoms, which also have 
constitutional status.50 These are significant obstacles to developing a coherent 
interpretation of fundamental rights under the Charter framework. 
 In spite of these concerns though, it is clear that, once placed within its 
historical and political context, the Charter must be considered in light of an attempt 
at democratisation and not merely of an instrumental constitutionalisation of the EU.51 
As Paul Craig has put it, ‘the very fact of putting those pre-existing provisions in a 
thing called a Charter of Fundamental Rights does give them a degree of peremptory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 De Burca and Aschenbrenner (n 36) 375–76. It has also been argued that the Charter was used as a 
shortcut to democracy rather than indicating a substantive concern with political inclusion: J Baquero 
Cruz, ‘What's Left of the Charter? Reflections on Law and Political Mythology’ (2008) 15:1 
Maastricht Journal 65, 74. 
46 Ibid, 73. See also PP Craig, The Lisbon Treaty : Law Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP 2013) 21-23. 
See also M Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, not Hearts’ (2008) 45:3 Common 
Market Law Review 617. 
47 J Kokott and C Sobotta, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union After Lisbon’, 
EUI Working Paper 2010/6, 6 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/15208> accessed 20 March 2013.  
48 See Baquero Cruz (n 45) 73. 
49 D Grimm, ‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation : The European Case’ (2015) 21:4 ELJ 
460, 469-471. Grimm notes that this is a problem of ‘over-constitutionalisation’ of EU law. 
50 Ibid. See Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste “Les Verts” v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23. 
51 See PP Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union’ (2001) 7:2 European Law 
Journal 125, 141-2. See also Eeckhout (n 40).  
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force that they would not otherwise have had.’52 The creation and, subsequently, 
granting of binding effect to the Charter, are constitutionally important actions, in 
themselves. The Charter is premised on the understanding that the language of 
fundamental rights is a code to which European institutions, the Member States and, 
crucially, their peoples, commit.53 It selects, collects and narrates fundamental rights 
in a novel manner from the perspective of EU law. It would thus be an understatement 
to say that the Charter only codifies existing protections of fundamental rights: in 
doing so, it defines a set of politically negotiated rights that incorporate national 
constitutional traditions but remain subject to judicial review at the supranational 
level.54 This is a substantive and not merely formal constitutional novelty.  
 The process of putting together a supranational charter reflects a political 
culture premised on the protection of fundamental rights across different levels of the 
EU legal order, as well as a belief that the peoples that make up the EU, and not just 
EU institutions and Member States, identify with their authorship. Thus, the story the 
Charter tells operates in parallel with the Treaties: it is not primarily concerned with 
questions of EU law, such as free trade or competition, even though it also comprises 
some of the most important features of the EU as a free trade union (such as the 
freedom to conduct a business).55 Rather, it is about how the EU should operate at the 
most basic level, as a social, economic and political union. This political function – 
or, at least, aspiration – sets the Charter apart from other sources of fundamental 
rights in the European Union, namely the European Convention and the general 
principles of EU law.56  
In turn, the application of the Charter can be distinguished, at least at the level 
of justification, from the application of individual rights within EU law to date, which 
mostly attached these claims to the exercise, albeit in some cases very loosely57, of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See PP Craig, European Scrutiny Committee, ‘Oral evidence: The Application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the UK, HC 979, 22 Jan 2014 (published 3 Feb 2014), available at 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/WrittenEvidence.svc/EvidenceHtml/5574, accessed 
30/1/2015. 
53 It is noteworthy that, whereas the Charter’s preamble states that ‘the peoples of Europe’ commit to 
these rights, and therefore retains the formulation used in the Constitutional Treaty, the preambles of 
both the TEU and TFEU refer only to the heads of state of the Member States.  
54 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in delivered on 1 March 2011 in Case C-69/10, Samba 
Diouf v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration [2011] I-07151, para 39. 
55 Article 16 EUCFR. 
56 Article 6 TEU. 
57 See, illustratively, Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(2002) ECR I-7091; Case C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of 
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market freedoms.58 Whereas, in the past, individual rights were largely a product of 
other EU action, the Charter represents a constitutive moment for European 
integration, in the sense that it defines a set of rights that must be met in order for any 
activity to be compliant with the basic premises upon which the EU is founded. Thus, 
even though the Charter may not extend the situations in which the EU can act, it adds 
a constitutional layer to the way in which it can act, that its political members have an 
active role in preserving. As a collectivity of fundamentals59, it serves an institutional 
role within a process of further integration, even if this did not come about in the 
manner, or as fully as, it had initially been envisaged.  
 If the Charter is understood as a constitutional instrument serving symbolic 
and organisational functions – an instrument that is, in other words, more about 
legitimacy and identification than it is about human rights standards60 – against what 
normative criteria can its provisions be interpreted? First of all, the Court could make 
reference to the European Convention and to international standards of rights 
protection. However, this would merely solve the problem of where the minimum 
standard for the application of (some of) the Charter’s provisions is set, but would not 
necessarily provide sufficient guidance as to where to set the binding standard of 
rights protection beyond such a minimum. Another way in which the Court could 
justify the imposition of a particular standard would be by engaging in a comparative 
analysis of the common constitutional traditions of the Member States. However, in 
order to provide guidance as to the reasons for choosing a particular standard in cases 
where conflicting interpretations are possible within the national laws of the Member 
States, an assessment of what level of protection is most useful from the perspective 
of EU law would also be required.  
Indeed, in order adequately to justify a specific interpretation of the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter the Court needs to demonstrate both that 
it has considered substantively the functioning of the national and international 
constitutional traditions that feed into the EU fundamental rights regime and that its 
interpretation provides a coherent fit for the EU constitutional order. This requires an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
State for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-09925; Case C-34/09 Zambrano v Office national de 
l’emploi [2011] I-01177. 
58 The Court has interpreted the Charter’s scope of application broadly, thus ensuring its application in 
all matters pertaining to EU law: Case C-617/10 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, 
EU:C:2013:105, para 19. 
59 See, generally, Teubner (n 9) 144-5.  
60 Baquero Cruz (n 45). 
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engagement with the reasons for protecting fundamental rights within the EU, as well 
as an assessment of the ideal division of powers and responsibilities therein. It follows 
that adjudicating at the EU level requires not only constitutional reasoning, but a kind 
of constitutional reasoning that matches a post-national polity: one that recognises the 
limits of supranational adjudication in the effective rendering of fundamental rights, 
enables individuals to exercise their rights as close as possible to their lives, and takes 
their sometimes localised concerns and different life choices (some more and some 
less affected by EU action) seriously. EU law therefore requires a theory for judging 
the application of fundamental rights, which can both coexist with a plurality of 
national constitutional systems and provide an adequate justification for the 
application of the supranational constitutional standard, the Charter.61  
1.3 A justification of post-national fundamental rights based on common values 
Making explicit reference to common values is one of the ways in which the 
application of the Charter might be justified. As noted above, the idea of commonality 
of values is prominent in the Lisbon Treaty itself: Article 2 TEU62 and the Charter’s 
Preamble refer to values. Furthermore, the Charter’s substantive chapters are 
premised thereon: they codify ‘the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, 
freedom, equality and solidarity’.63 These values could therefore be seen as the first 
point of reference for guiding the interpretation of the Charter’s provisions at the EU 
level. As Joseph Weiler has noted, ‘there is no European Volk’, as a demos rooted in a 
singular, shared social and historical experience.64 However, the existence of a set of 
common values, such as the ones mentioned above, confirms that a basic agreement 
regarding the normative bases of the Union as a project broader than the market is in 
place (particularly insofar as these values now have a prominent place in the Lisbon 
Treaty and the Charter itself).  
 Indeed, justifying interpretations of fundamental rights based on common 
values resonates well with the academic literature in this field as well as with the 
Court’s justification of fundamental rights to date. For Weiler, the EU public sphere 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See C Joerges, ‘The Idea of a 3-Dimensional Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form’ (2010) RECON 
Working Paper 2010/05, May 2010, available at 
http://www.europeanrights.eu/public/commenti/jeorges_testo.pdf, accessed 10 May 2016.   
62 See A Von Bogdandy et al, ‘Reverse Solange - Protecting The Essence Of Fundamental Rights 
Against EU Member States’ [2012] Common Market Law Review 490. 
63 Preamble to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, [2010] OJ C 83/389. 
64 JHH Weiler, UR Haltern, FC Mayer, ‘European Democracy and its Critique’ (1995) 18:3 West 
European Politics 4, 10. 
	  	   13	  
operates ‘on the basis of shared values, a shared understanding of rights and societal 
duties and a shared rational, intellectual culture which transcend ethno-cultural 
differences’.65 A similar outlook can be gleaned from Advocate General Maduro’s 
Opinion in Kadi. He envisioned the European Union as a hierarchical ‘municipal’ 
constitutional order premised both on foundational treaties and on values that the 
Court of Justice as a constitutional adjudicator was ultimately required to uphold.66 
He argued that the Court 
‘cannot […] turn its back on the fundamental values that lie at the basis of the 
Community legal order and which it has the duty to protect. Respect for other 
institutions is meaningful only if it can be built on a shared understanding of 
these values and on a mutual commitment to protect them.’67 
 
As such, it is necessary to devote some space to the problems to which an application 
of the Charter as an instantiation of common values can lead.  
A crucial prerequisite of this view is that the understanding of values is in fact 
‘shared’. This is not always easy to establish. Even if a set of values that can be 
commonly agreed upon across EU states can be identified in Article 2 TEU and the 
Charter’s Preamble, it does not necessarily follow that these values are understood 
and implemented in the same way across the EU or that they are considered 
foundational in equal measure in each of its constituent legal orders, so as to be able 
to justify with any degree of certainty the application of a particular rendering of the 
Charter’s provisions.68 In order to justify the application of the Charter on the basis of 
common values, the Court would therefore, at the very least, need to carry out a 
substantive comparative assessment of the ways in which they are common/shared, or 
indeed an independent evaluation of their ‘true’ meaning within the EU. In other 
words, if the Charter can be normatively justified on the basis of common values, this 
can only be done by making a careful distinction between the commitment to values 
as bases for political organization (which indeed follows from the Treaties) and the 
assumption that they themselves translate to a common constitutional stance regarding 
the parameters of their protection (which does not).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Ibid, 19. 
66 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 16 January 2008 in Joined Cases C-
402/05P and C-415/05P Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council of the European Union and Commission of 
the European Communities [2008] ECR I- 6351, 21. 
67 Ibid, para 44. 
68 One of the clearest examples of this is the value of solidarity: see Protocol 30.  
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To date, the Court’s case law does not make this distinction. Rather than 
speaking about the normative content of values as a pre-legal condition69 interpreted 
on the basis of rational argumentation concerning the common good70, the Court has 
mostly advanced an analysis of the extent to which a general principle of law derived 
from common constitutional traditions is in place concerning a certain value, such as 
equality. This is a highly problematic position, as a line of case law in the horizontal 
context and particularly in the context of non-discrimination and social rights 
demonstrates. In cases such as Mangold and Kucukdeveci, the Court has translated the 
EU-wide commitment to equality into a general principle of EU law protecting 
against age discrimination.71 In these cases, the Court appeared to presume – without 
engaging in a substantive comparative exercise – that this general principle was 
common to the Member States and could therefore be invoked throughout the EU 
legal order, against Member States and private actors. However, in reality, the 
commitment to equal treatment did not necessarily mean, prior to these rulings, that 
protections against discrimination on grounds of age were in place in most Member 
States.72 As such, the Court’s justification for the application of the right to equal 
treatment in respect of age, namely that it constituted a general principle derived from 
common constitutional traditions, was both contestable as a matter of comparative 
constitutional law73 and at the same time failed clearly to define the substantive 
meaning of the common value from which that right was, arguably, derived: equality. 
This approach has been maintained – and in some cases heightened – even 
after the entry into force of the Charter, as demonstrated in rulings such as Dominguez 
and AMS.74 In spite of the fact that Charter rights are the product of political 
legitimation, the Court has continued in a number of cases to render their exercise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Cf Brunner v The European Union Treaty (Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92) [1993] WL 965303, 
paras 41-44, footnotes omitted. See MA Wilkinson, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism in the European 
Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce?’ (2015) 21:3 European Law Journal 313, 318-19. 
70 See J Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ 64 University of Chicago Law Review 765. 
71 Case C-144/04, Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981; Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH 
[2010] ECR I-365. 
72 PP Craig, 'The ECJ and ultra vires action: A conceptual analysis' (2011) 48:2 Common Market Law 
Review 395. 
73 2 BverfGE 2661/06 – Honeywell, 61, 68; For a detailed discussion, see: M Payandeh, ‘Constitutional 
Review of EU Law after Honeywell: Contextualising the Relationship between the German 
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 9. 
74 Case C-282/10, Dominguez v Centre Informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la 
Région Centre, EU:C:2012:33; Case C-176/12, Association de Médiation Sociale v Union Locale des 
Syndicats CGT Hichem Laboubi Union Départementale CGT Des Bouches-du-Rhône Confédération 
Générale Du Travail (CGT), EU:C:2014:2. 
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dependent on the existence of an antecedent general principle of law.75 It does not 
however explicitly refer to the broader values that these fundamental rights enshrine 
and which may have been, if one were to accept that their shared meaning can be 
pinned down, sufficient justifications for reaching a particular constitutional 
interpretation. Thus, even though substantively engaging in a value-based approach to 
the application of rights, the Court has not openly articulated the basic premises of 
this position, or assessed the relative worth of different conceptions of particular 
values, such as equality, dignity, or solidarity, from an EU perspective. Furthermore, 
the Court’s actual discussion of the Charter has appeared to undermine the idea, also 
clear from the Charter’s preamble, that the values mentioned therein are in fact 
‘indivisible’: rather, put simply, the effect of the Court’s case law to date is that 
fundamental rights concerning equality enjoy a higher degree of protection than those 
concerning, primarily, solidarity.76   
Thus, whereas in its case law the Court presents conclusions on the basis of 
seemingly uncontroversial general principles of law, the exercise is far from 
normatively innocent. It appears to second-guess the equal constitutional status of 
Charter provisions and thus judicially to reassess the extent to which the EU is 
premised on respect for each of the values mentioned in the preamble. This approach 
appears to confirm a view of European law as the product of moral consensus on the 
common good and the Court of Justice as its authoritative interpreter.77 Its undertone 
seems to be an understanding of EU law as a progressive force towards truth78 and, in 
turn, a vision of national constitutional laws as naturally ‘suspect’.79 There is, in other 
words, an assumption that integration through law can deliver social justice, if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ibid. See also Case C-447/09, Prigge and Others v Deutsche Lufthansa, EU:C:2011:573, para 48; 
Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf v Ministre Du Travail, De l’Emploi Et De l’Immigration [2011] I-07151 
para 49. 
76 Dominguez and AMS (n 74) indeed both concerned provisions of the solidarity chapter (the rights to 
paid annual leave and information and consultation within the undertaking enshrined in Articles 31 and 
27 EUCFR respectively). 
77 F De Witte, ‘The Architecture of a Social Market Economy’ LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers 13/2015, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=! 2613907, 22.  
78 A Albi, ‘An Essay on How the Discourse on Sovereignty and the Co-Operativeness of National 
Courts Has Diverted Attention From the Erosion of Classic Constitutional Rights in the EU’ in M 
Claes and others, Constitutional conversations in Europe: actors, topics and procedures (Intersentia 
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in the Writing of Europe’ (1997) 3 European Law Journal 165, 186. 
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allowed to flourish, and that it can do so even ‘without the involvement of politics.’80 
As De Witte rightly notes:  
‘The role of law, in the integration process, is very particular. It is used to 
depoliticise political questions, create de facto convergence of national rules, 
and to push forward a messianistic idea of Europe.[…] The problem with this 
understanding of law, however, is evident: it presumes consensus on the 
‘good’ to be achieved. As such, EU law runs against the problem of legitimacy 
whenever it engages in redistributive practices (as opposed to regulatory 
questions).’81  
 
Even cases which prima facie advance the substance of fundamental rights, 
such as Mangold and Küçükdeveci, have not offered a broader discussion of the limits 
of the Court’s jurisdiction in these fields – a crucial aspect of the operation of 
constitutional law – or of the role that these fundamental rights played in the 
development of the EU as a constitutional order with economic and social 
dimensions. Rather, they have been confined to specific provisions that the Court has 
considered ‘general principles’ of law, in a line of case law that favoured individual 
assessments of specific rights (such as age discrimination, but not annual leave), 
without offering an overall view of the role of fundamental rights in the post-national 
context.82  
It follows that Whereas the Court may be in a position to justify, in principle, 
particular interpretations of the Charter on the basis of common values that feed into 
an EU-wide understanding of fundamental rights, the manner in which the case law to 
date has reconstructed common values is objectionable as it generally avoids this 
assessment.83 A theory of the adjudication of fundamental rights needs to be 
understood as a permanent, structural feature of the EU constitutional order in order to 
be meaningful. Developing adequate rational argumentation about justice is necessary 
so as to establish a culture of mutual respect in a constitutionally pluralist 
community.84 As John Rawls imagined it: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid, 19. 
81 Ibid, 22. 
82 For a more detailed account of these issues, see: E Frantziou, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the Reasons for Horizontality’ (2015) 21:5 ELJ 657, 
83 L Pech, 'Between judicial minimalism and avoidance: The Court of Justice’s sidestepping of 
fundamental constitutional issues in Römer and Dominguez' (2012) 6 CMLRev 1841, 1857. 
84 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (n 10) 166 ; JS Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. 
Liberals, Critics, Contestations (OUP 2000) 48. See also RC Post, ‘Who’s Afraid of Jurispathic 
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‘We appeal to political conceptions of justice, and to ascertainable evidence and 
facts open to public view, in order to reach conclusions about what we think are 
the most reasonable political institutions and policies. Public justification is not 
simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed to others: it proceeds correctly 
from premises we accept and think others could reasonably accept to 
conclusions we think they could also reasonably accept.’85 
 
While justifying interpretations of the Charter on the basis of commonality of values 
may be possible to the extent that it fosters a discourse about the appropriate meaning 
of rights across the EU legal order, this would involve a thorough re-evaluation of the 
Court’s existing case law. The Court’s approach fails to capture the Charter’s role in 
the European integration process and structurally prevents the interpretation and re-
interpretation of fundamental rights in the public sphere, placing them instead within 
rather rigid, judicially determined assumptions about morally shared values, traditions 
or principles. This position cannot sufficiently articulate the necessity of political 
engagement with EU matters nor does it emphasise constitutional dialogue between 
different constitutional courts, as the interpretation of the Charter requires. 
 More broadly though, the desirability of justifications of fundamental rights 
premised on the sharedness of values can be challenged altogether, from a conceptual 
perspective. Such justifications often conflate two issues that require careful 
distinction: on the one hand, the common values rooted in moral convention, popular 
wisdom or indeed, a common intellectual and philosophical tradition86, which are 
openly tested in the public sphere, and, on the other hand, the commitment to 
constitutional rights as a premise of the public sphere itself.87 Whereas the former, 
moral commonality, may be able to render a public sphere more cohesive, it is not 
required in order for commitment to fundamental rights to be effective as the product 
of a structured process of constitutional compromise. Conflating these issues is 
problematic, as it ossifies public morality through judicial interpretation and 
misunderstands the role of fundamental rights in the public sphere.  
 Furthermore, the neutrality of values as an interpretive benchmark for 
fundamental rights can be strongly contested.88 Whereas the experience of war, the 
establishment of democratic governments and the fostering of largely private-centric 
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1999) 213. 
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market economies may create some of the conditions under which fundamental rights 
operate throughout the EU, it would be highly problematic to rely on an EU judicial 
narrative about these experiences alone to justify a particular rendering of a 
fundamental right.89 In addition to potentially common histories and social problems, 
other, equally important histories and social issues diverge greatly. The development 
of post-communist regimes, the unequal wealth distribution encountered amongst EU 
Member States, and the vastly differently experienced EU financial crisis also shape 
the meaning that particular rights take in different European contexts. To justify 
interpretations of the Charter based on a single understanding of the meaning and 
scope of a value would appear to homogenise the plurality of identities, personal as 
well as constitutional, that coexist within the legal framework of the EU. At the same 
time, it would suggest that only those who share a particular narrative can be true 
members of the EU framework, thus creating precisely the type of exclusions from the 
EU public sphere that fundamental rights strive to contain.   
  Indeed, moral commonality within the demos is not required in order for the 
Court to determine what constitutional responsibilities ensue from the Charter. Value-
based justifications for fundamental rights become particularly unconvincing once/if 
we disentangle the concept of post-national democracy from that of an overarching 
unity and conceptualise it in a more open-ended manner, as a demoicracy that 
includes a multitude of previously more or less uniform demoi, which discursively 
interpret and reinterpret their public commitments to one another in a novel political 
framework.90 Furthermore, even if we were to accept that the EU gives rise to a 
‘supranational, civic, value-driven demos’91, as Weiler has suggested, it is important 
to recognise that these adjectives do not all hold the same weight, from the 
perspective of justifying the application of a supranational constitutional standard. It 
is the civic character of the EU public sphere and not its attachment, as Craig puts it, 
to ‘some rigid set of common values’, that renders the political process democratic.92 
Assessments of constitutionality in a post-national polity committed to the democratic 
process must be primarily concerned with the former question (to ensure the civic 
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character of decision-making), rather than the latter (to give effect to particular 
values). In the words of Albie Sachs, the adjudication of fundamental rights within a 
particular constitutional framework is not just ‘about our commitment to the values 
expressed by the Constitution, but about which institutions the Constitution envisages 
as being primarily responsible for giving effect to those values’.93 
In this sense, to justify the application of EU constitutional law on the basis of 
uniform prescriptions about how we should give effect to certain values becomes 
unconvincing. It is only political agreement implicit in membership of a constitutional 
order that is relevant from the perspective of constitutional adjudication, if the latter is 
understood, as section 1.2 has argued, as a safeguard of the political process. By 
contrast, the reassessment of values – and in turn, the re-imagination of constitutional 
form – takes place within the political process itself. It follows that, rather than 
making the application of constitutional law dependent on the sharedness of values, it 
is preferable to acknowledge the centrality of constitutional discourse itself to the 
strengthening and maintenance of the public sphere, in which different values are 
expressed and challenged.  
1.4 Post-national citizenship and the idea of the right to have rights 
Enjoying rights within a particular institutional framework for their protection is an 
indispensable part of a well-functioning and inclusive deliberative process, both at the 
national and at the post-national level.94 As such, an adequate framework for 
interpreting fundamental rights under the Charter can be based on political equality, 
expressed through a ‘right to have rights’. This right is none other than, as Kant first 
formulated it, the right that all human beings have to ‘present themselves to society’.95 
But it is the Arendtian reinterpretation of the right to have rights, positing it as a 
precondition for political organisation, which is particularly interesting from the 
perspective of post-national constitutional law. 
 Arendt believed that all rights ultimately take effect within a particular 
community. ‘We are not born equal’, she explained, but ‘we become equal as 
members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually 
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equal rights’.96  More specifically, ‘our political life rests on the assumption that we 
can produce equality through organisation, because man can act in and change and 
build a common world, together with his equals and only with his equals’.97 By 
contrast, 
‘The human being who has lost his place in a community, his political status 
in the struggle of his time, and the legal personality which makes his actions 
and part of his destiny a consistent whole, is left with those qualities which 
usually can become articulate in the sphere of private life and must remain 
unqualified, mere existence in all matters of public concern.’98  
 
 For this reason, she thought that the one right that did not ‘spring from within 
the nation’99 and required more than national guarantees was the right to be 
recognised as a holder of rights qua right to membership of the political community: 
the ‘right to have rights’.100 Indeed, for Arendt, the right to have rights is not just the 
right to present oneself to society, but more concretely the right to belong. As 
Benhabib explains, it is a moral right to be recognised as the holder of political status, 
to which constitutional rights can then attach.101 It is, in other words, ‘the entitlement 
to all civil rights—including rights to association, property, and contract—and 
eventually to political rights.102 Only by having access to the rights guaranteed within 
a political community can a human being enter such a community on the basis of 
equality.103  But how can this right apply to the EU legal order and, more specifically, 
how can it determine the application of the Charter? 
1.4.1 Justifying the Charter on the basis of the right to have rights 
 
Arendt’s conception of the right to have rights was not that it should apply to a post-
national quasi-federal structure like the EU: it was a universal right to be recognised 
as the holder of political status within a nation state by the international community. 
Nonetheless, taking inspiration from this idea, one need not deny its value in the EU 
constitutional context, as a context defined by conditions of reduced sovereignty104 
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and requiring, as noted earlier, a standard that accommodates multiple narratives 
about the protection of fundamental rights. In a tiered polity comprising local, 
national and supranational institutions and within which differences in cultures, 
identities and living standards abound, a basic set of fundamental rights as minimal 
equalising conditions accessible to all is required.105 Arguably, this is the core overall 
function of the Charter: it sets out the rights that are in fact presupposed within the EU 
public sphere. It is necessary to interpret the Charter’s provisions against this 
overarching function.  
The Charter signals a shift in EU law not only in the sense that it concretises a 
set of rights which are necessary in order for human beings to live well and to make 
meaningful choices, but also because it is an explicit affirmation of a political 
commitment by ‘the peoples of Europe’ to conditions upon which they are building a 
‘common future’, as proclaimed in its Preamble. As noted in section 1.2 above, the 
Charter’s purpose was not to integrate approaches regarding fundamental rights in the 
European Union, but rather to establish a common code for fundamental rights, to 
which both the Member States and the EU commit. Indeed, it is only as a set of 
protections gathered together that the Charter adds to the EU constitutional landscape, 
especially to the extent that, one by one, many of its provisions may have formerly 
been enshrined in the Court’s case law already.  
For this reason, it is possible to understand the overall application of the 
Charter as a commitment not merely to the provisions in question – these were 
enshrined in EU and Member State laws already – but to the very right to have rights 
across the different layers of the EU constitutional order. If the right to enjoy rights 
contained in the Charter is prejudiced, whether in a localized or EU-wide context, this 
has implications for the quality of democracy as well as for the ability of the EU 
public to take part in the deliberative process in the EU, which operates at different 
levels: local, national and supranational. In the most basic sense, therefore, it is this 
right – the right to equal political status – that the constellation of constitutional rights 
contained in the Charter seeks to protect, to the extent that it sets out the preconditions 
for the exercise of communicative freedom in the public sphere.106  
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 This justification for applying the Charter is attractive for two main reasons. 
Firstly, by adding a layer of review based on equality of status to the application of 
the Charter, the right to have rights supplies an answer to a pivotal issue: that of when 
a particular claim falls within the sphere of constitutional, public law entitlements at 
the post-national level. Secondly, this justification looks at society and the actors that 
comprise it without collapsing it into the market. It offers a dynamic, non-static 
conception of rights: it is a right to access the framework of fundamental rights 
protection in the EU political community, so that one can take part in its re-
interpretation in the public sphere and thus meaningfully identify with its authorship. 
Indeed, in light of its constitutionally imbued drafting context and ‘federal’ 
implications107, the Charter articulates a set of provisions with a legitimating character 
for the EU public sphere and represents a possibility for reimagining fundamental 
rights in the EU as a polity of citizens/members. Understanding the right to have 
rights as its main justification recognises the Charter’s role in rendering the EU public 
sphere more substantively democratic, as discussed in section 1.2, and spells out the 
inherent link of fundamental rights with political membership (they are enabling 
conditions thereof).    
1.4.2 The right to have rights as inclusion through citizenship / membership 
 
In light of the preceding discussion, it can be argued that a supranational guarantee by 
the Court of the right to have rights can mean, quite simply, that EU citizens should 
enjoy the Charter’s provisions equally across the EU legal order (and within the 
Member States). This requires the CJEU to coordinate Member State standards, 
where equal access to the fundamental rights protected in the Charter is prejudiced.  
The link between fundamental rights and citizenship in the EU is well known. 
As Advocate General Sharpston had noted in her Opinion in Zambrano, insofar as 
fundamental rights have been integrated in the EU constitutional framework through 
the Charter, it is important to consider whether citizenship of the Union has now come 
to ‘mean something more radical’ than what it has meant so far, namely rights 
primarily attached to cross-border movement: can it mean ‘true citizenship, carrying 
with it a uniform set of rights and obligations, in a Union under the rule of law in 
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which respect for fundamental rights must necessarily play an integral part?’108 If that 
is the case, then fundamental rights at the EU level entail not merely a reaffirmation, 
but rather a redefinition of the political commitments made on behalf of (and largely 
in the name of) the peoples that make up the EU. The right to have rights as a right to 
participate within a political community is consonant with such a justification – and 
has indeed in the past been understood as the right to enjoy all those rights that ensue 
from citizenship.109 
Does, then, a notion of citizenship operating within the EU mean that 
fundamental rights under the Charter should apply to those who have full political 
rights only, thus denying its universality? An approach that privileges citizens in 
respect of fundamental rights would be greatly problematic, not only in terms of 
social and political philosophy110, but also in terms of political accountability. The 
Charter’s appeals to a political order premised on universal values – one that owes, 
furthermore, responsibilities to the ‘human community’111 – would risk not only 
sounding like empty rhetoric but, justified on the basis of citizenship of the Union, of 
also actually maintaining exclusionary patterns. As Jo Shaw notes,  
‘A paradox faces all polities: so long as the criterion for allocating political 
rights of participation has been overwhelmingly the formal one of nationality 
[…], many who live and perhaps indeed are born within the boundaries of any 
given polity have been unable to participate politically, fully or even 
partially.’112  
 
Indeed, the EU is not a universal political community, but rather a strict members’ 
club, in which only certain groups of people enjoy political rights. If, justified on the 
basis of the right to have rights, the Charter is ultimately intended to serve active 
forms of citizenship of the EU political order, how can this be reconciled with the 
universal aspirations of most of its provisions?113 Does it not create rights/duties for 
the non-citizen finding him/herself within the scope of EU law? In the remainder of 
this section, I hope to clarify that it does.  
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 If EU citizenship in a technical sense provided the normative justification for 
the Charter, it would entail a rather restrictive conception of authorship that could 
exclude the concerns of non-citizens from the public sphere. In order to form a people 
though, it is not only necessary to have a legally protected community of equal 
citizens but also to ensure that no one is excluded ‘who is affected by the possible 
coercive measures of the legal community’.114 For this reason, it is necessary to 
concede, firstly, that the current terms of political inclusion in the EU through 
citizenship, which acknowledge only Member State citizenship rules but shy away 
from offering any means of identification beyond those offered at the national level, 
need to be rethought.115 Ideally, a re-imagination of the concept of European 
citizenship as a platform for non-national affiliation, independent of national 
citizenship, may be appropriate in the establishment of a fully inclusive, EU-wide 
public sphere and would be more compatible with the universal aspirations of the 
Charter than the current modes of inclusion/exclusion.116 At the same time though, it 
would be mistaken, when considering how the Charter’s provisions should be 
interpreted at present, to construe the right to have rights as a right to citizenship in a 
strict sense.  
 The right to have rights can be posited as a normative justification for the 
application of the Charter, precisely because it conceptualises the rights granted to 
individuals within a political community themselves as means of political status. This 
requires that every individual affected by EU law be granted those rights. Indeed, the 
very practice and claiming of rights in the public sphere, even by those who do not 
possess full political rights, is a jurisgenerative process.117 It includes a broad range of 
platforms of political participation, such as local politics, public debates, the free 
public expression and manifestation of opinion and belief, and of course, asserting 
rights in court. As Ingram puts it:  
‘Far from being the apolitical basis of politics, rights are vehicles of 
politicisation: political movements arise to expand old rights or claim new 
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ones. Rights are not established in principle and then protected by power, be it 
by that of one’s own state or another; they are invented and reinvented by 
particular actors through the very practice of claiming them’.118 
 
In turn, participation in the modern public sphere does not simply depend on 
the exercise of political right in the sense of voting or imparting political speech, but 
can be participation through different means, e.g. through the exercise of rights in the 
workplace.119 Fundamental rights operating within a political community (in line with 
which the Treaties must be interpreted) enable public deliberation. Therein lies, 
precisely, their fundamentality: they structure political life and allow individuals to 
participate in the matters that concern them.120 The right to have rights is simply ‘a 
universal right to political activity for every individual, in all the domains in which 
the problem of collectively organized possession, power, and knowledge is posed’.121 
The idea of the right to have rights as a guide to interpreting the Charter thus 
challenges the distinctions between citizen and non-citizen and attaches to 
‘citizenship’ in a philosophical sense qua participation in a constitutional polity. It is, 
in other words, the recognition of the very ability to have rights acknowledged and re-
interpreted in the public sphere as a type of political activity. As D’Entrèves puts it,  
‘Once citizenship is viewed as the process of active deliberation about 
competing identity projections, its value would reside in the possibility of 
establishing forms of collective identity that can be acknowledged, tested, and 
transformed in a discursive and democratic fashion.’122 
 
As such, the determining factor for applying the Charter can be based on the 
question of whether effective access to a provision guaranteed therein has been 
compromised and not adequately remedied, on some level (national or supranational), 
within the fields of application of EU law. Determining the applicability of the 
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Charter by assessing whether a right to access its provisions effectively has been 
breached recognises the potential for membership of non-members and indeed the 
multiplicity of membership types that a political community, particularly a multi-
layered political community like the EU, can give rise to.123 If the foundations of the 
protection of fundamental rights in the European Union are in turn understood on the 
basis of this, inclusive, conception of post-national membership/political status, they 
require – and justify – fundamental rights and obligations to observe them to the 
extent that citizens meaningfully identify as the authors of the constitutional 
arrangement.124 Indeed, a right to enjoy the Charter’s provisions effectively can be 
seen as a code of ‘active participation and solidarity’ within the EU polity.125  
1.4.3 What kind of standards are required for the operation of fundamental rights 
at the supranational level?  
 
Whereas I have so far explained why a political justification for the Charter is 
constitutionally preferable to justifications premised on the commonality of values, I 
have not discussed, more specifically, in what way normatively justifying 
interpretations of the Charter based on the right to have rights or, differently put, on 
equal access to fundamental rights, changes the existing EU fundamental rights 
landscape. It is worth exploring this question by briefly making reference to an 
existing debate in the field of fundamental rights. The horizontal effect of 
fundamental rights and the case law pertaining thereto provides a topical and 
illustrative example.  
The horizontal effect doctrine is, in principle, three-dimensional and 
comprises direct, indirect and state-mediated forms of horizontality.126 A legal order 
that seeks to offer a complete answer to the question of how fundamental rights can 
enter private relations must therefore take account of all three levels.127 In practice, 
though, most legal orders only offer partial recourse to fundamental rights in 
horizontal relations and understand its dimensions very differently: some 
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conceptualise horizontality through indirect effect only (e.g. Germany) and few offer 
direct recourse to fundamental rights in private relations (e.g. Ireland and, in certain 
cases, the UK). As such, from a supranational perspective, it may be necessary to 
acknowledge that different forms of horizontality can be interchangeable in terms of 
outcome.  
Indeed, as a matter of fact, the specific instantiation of horizontality followed 
has had little substantive impact on the outcome of particular cases, even within EU 
law: for instance, in a case like Foster v British Gas, the Court attributed the actions 
of a privatised undertaking to the state, thus requiring it not to discriminate as if it 
were a public authority.128 In Murphy, it found an employer liable through indirect 
effect129; whereas in Defrenne, this outcome was reached through the means of direct 
horizontality.130 All of these cases concerned, effectively, the same fundamental right 
(subsets of non-discrimination on grounds of gender) and all took effect in the 
employment context.  Furthermore, the effect of all of these cases was that private 
employers had to observe the right in relations with their employees in the future and 
pay compensation for not having done so in the cases in question.  
However, the horizontality case law both prior and after the entry into force of 
the Charter, presented these issues almost exclusively through the prism of the 
availability of direct horizontal effect only, without actually considering the legal 
structures available to give effect to fundamental rights in private relations within 
national law. However, it is not always clear whether it is essential to render the 
Charter’s provisions available to a claimant through the mechanism of direct effect 
only, or in fact in what way this would undermine its effectiveness. Understanding the 
application of the Charter based on the right to have rights justifies a change to this 
approach. It confirms that it is neither the aim nor the mandate of EU constitutional 
law to harmonise national constitutional practices, but merely to integrate them in a 
mutually accommodating way, insofar as the scope of EU law is engaged. If, as I have 
argued above, the Charter is understood as a reflection of a right to have rights within 
the EU, stipulating the specific manner in which its provisions feed into relations 
between private parties is unnecessary unless access to the provisions set out in the 
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Charter is compromised because of the way in which horizontality is offered at the 
national level.  
Indeed, perceived as a vehicle of equal access to the Charter’s protections, 
horizontal effect can overall be particularly useful: it provides a mechanism for the 
inclusion of those affected by EU law but in fact excluded from legal protection at the 
national level, by using the institutional structures that are already in place nationally 
in order to give effect to fundamental rights. Interpreting the Charter through the lens 
of the right to have rights therefore operates as a limit to the Court’s role: horizontal 
effect only becomes a question of EU law when a Member State fails to give effect to 
a provision of the Charter, such as the right to not to be discriminated against (Article 
21 EUCFR) or the right to be informed and consulted in the workplace (Article 27 
EUCFR), in such a way that it places a subset of EU citizens in an unequal position 
compared to those residing or working in another Member State (or indeed vis-à-vis 
other groups within the same state, to the extent that the latter situation remains within 
the scope of EU law).  
Indeed, from the perspective of EU law, violations of fundamental rights 
matter when they affect the possibility of equal political status within the EU and 
deprive the notion of an EU citizenship premised on rights of practical meaning.131 In 
other words, an understanding of the inclusionary features of horizontal effect at the 
constitutional level means that the primary legal question, that of horizontal 
applicability, engages the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice when a situation falls 
within the scope of EU law. By contrast, national courts are in principle best placed to 
determine how the Charter’s provisions can be delivered, in light of the institutional 
tools at their disposal. Whereas the Court can and should give guidance as to the 
desired fundamental rights outcome from an EU perspective, national courts should in 
turn be allowed to determine how best to fit that outcome within the structures of 
national law. There is no inherent value in recognising an ‘absolute nature’ to 
constitutional-order rights derived from EU law.132 Rather, it is important that we 
recognise that cases like Defrenne or Küçükdeveci, concern institutional exclusions 
from rights guaranteed within the European Union. The imposition of a horizontal 
obligation to observe the right to equal pay or the right not to be discriminated against 
at the supranational constitutional level is not only about the extent to which we value 
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equality, but also about recognising the link between the exercise of these rights and 
the ability to participate in public life.  
The problems with prescribing a particular method for the application of 
fundamental rights are particularly clear in a context as terse as horizontal effect. The 
right to have rights as a guide in the supranational application of fundamental rights 
can nonetheless be extended to the Charter’s overall application, as is clear from case 
law across the spectrum of the Court’s fundamental rights judgments, such as 
Zambrano133, N.S134, Kadi135, or Delvigne136. It is impossible for the Court to engage 
in meaningful interpretations of the Charter without setting out the content of 
fundamental rights within the EU and properly delimitating when the Charter standard 
is engaged. This does not concern only a determination of the fields of application of 
the Charter – an issue covered by Article 51(1) EUCFR and authoritatively 
determined in Fransson.137 It also concerns the question of when supranational 
jurisdiction, as opposed to national standards of rights protection, should be utilised. 
Effectively, the right to have rights as a justification for engaging the Charter operates 
as a margin of appreciation for Member States in respect of how they deliver 
fundamental rights, but one that fully retains the prescriptive character of the latter 
within the EU. Unlike the minimum-level-of-protection-affirming margin of 
appreciation that exists, for example, within the Convention context, founding the 
supranational constitutional adjudication of the Charter’s provisions on the basis of a 
post-national right to belong recognises that each of the Charter’s provisions 
constitutes a basic tenet of what it means to be the holder of political status within the 
EU.  
Thus, rather than being based on a determination of whether specific Charter 
provisions constitute general principles of law or values that should be recognised by 
all, it is possible to render the application of the Charter dependent on equality in 
particular, in the sense of the equal right to access a basic set of safeguards through 
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which reasonable political discourse as authorship can be exercised.138 Each of the 
Charter’s provisions, as a specific instantiation of the right to have rights, must be 
examined in light of this function.  
1.5 Conclusion: a political conception of fundamental rights in the European 
Union 
Today, it is impossible to imagine a form of EU constitutionalism that is disengaged 
from fundamental rights. These have developed in tandem with the Union and form 
part of its constitutional heritage, not only because they are enshrined in national 
constitutions but indeed because EU law itself has developed with – and through – the 
incorporation of fundamental rights standards, initially as uncodified commitments 
guaranteed by the Court of Justice and eventually as codified rights enshrined in its 
own Charter. Together with the Lisbon Treaty and following a process of successive 
Treaty revisions, the introduction of a binding Charter signals the evolution of an 
important aspect of EU constitutional law: that of the role of rights in the EU legal 
order as judicially determined commitments interpreted against the goal of EU 
integration. Under the Charter, a discourse about rights in the EU is centred on the 
person, both in their capacity as a self-interested individual engaged in modern forms 
of survival, such as commodity and services exchange within the single market but 
also, more importantly, as a political actor and part of a community shared with 
others.  
 This paper has sought to demonstrate that, in interpreting the Charter’s 
provisions, it is necessary to take account of the links of this instrument to the 
structure of Europe’s broader constitutional space. This space is comprised of, rather 
than antagonised by, national constitutions, together with cosmopolitan aspirations 
and ideals. At the supranational level, fundamental rights operate as guarantees of at 
least a minimal degree of inclusion within a vastly unequal political space and 
concern the ability to govern (and be governed) in a democratic fashion therein. As 
such, the most appropriate justification for assessing whether the application of 
national law amounts to a breach of the Charter, is to assess whether such application 
prejudices the very right to have rights, in the sense of a right to enjoy the rights 
granted within the EU constitutional framework and required in order meaningfully to 
access the EU public sphere on the basis of equality.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See Benhabib (n 94) 2004, 181. 
	  	   31	  
 Whereas a political justification for the Charter based on the right to have 
rights may therefore, at first glance, appear causally remote, its value becomes clear 
once we understand the Charter in its proper context, that is as part of a broader 
process of constitutional change that sought to restore a sense of authorship in the 
‘peoples of Europe’ about the constitutional arrangement in which they live. The 
adjudication of fundamental rights operating within a multi-layered constitutional 
polity involves a great number of interpretations – even conflicting interpretations – 
about the values underlying these rights. Disagreement about these things is 
sometimes necessary and indeed desirable. Its locus is, however, within the public 
sphere, constructed and accessed through an existing rights framework, rather than 
being the subject of judicial determination. By contrast, the safeguard of access to the 
framework of fundamental rights that enables the operation of the public sphere falls 
squarely within the realm of constitutional adjudication and requires not only national 
but also post-national guarantees, in order to become effective.  
